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Comments
THE UNIVERSALITY OF A CURSE: "FUTURE INTERESTS"
IN THE FRENCH LAW
A plague o' both your houses!
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act iii, sc. 1, 1. 94.
The property systems of civil law jurisdictions in sharp
contrast with those of common law origin, have long enjoyed a
reputation for remarkable simplicity. That "wonderful calculus"
of possessory estates and future interests, commonly known
simply as "future interests,"' is the doctrinal structure responsi-
L The standard definition of a "future interest" is more redundant than
Informative. For instance, 1 Simes, The Law of Future Interests (1936) 2.
1 1, describes a "future interest" as "an Interest in land or other things in
which the privilege of possession or of enjoyment is future and not present."
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ble for many of the complexities of the Anglo-American property
system. In the civil law such a structure is said to be non-exist-
ent. The present comment seeks to test this assertion by analyz-
ing the property concepts of France2 to determine whether
functional equivalents of "future interests" exist in that import-
ant civilian jurisdiction. Included among the concepts examined
are the substitution fidgicommissaire, the "permitted" substitu-
tions, the fideicommis simple, the legacy de residuo, the condi-
tional grant, the iducia, the stipulation pour autrui, the usufruct,
and the fondation. Such an examination may show that the
alleged civilian simplicity is more specious than remarkable.
The French system of property law offers a fertile field for
the contemporaneous division of ownership. According to the
traditional French view, "ownership" expresses the idea of the
most complete power which the government allows an individual
over a thing.8 This is "ownership" in its fullest sense.' But, the
commentators unanimously tell us, "ownership" is sufficiently
plastic to be susceptible of limitations and adaptations almost
without number.' Following the classical Roman analysis, the
French separate "ownership" into the usus, the fructus, and the
abusus.' Usus is the privilege to make all those uses of a thing
which are compatible with its nature;7 fructus is the attribute
2. Professor Rheinstein has pointed out that "a comparison of the real
property idea and approaches of the civil law and the common law encoun-
ters the initial difficulty that there is no longer such a thing as 'Civil Law'."
Rheinstein, Some Fundamental Differences in Real Property Ideas of the
"Civil Law" and the Common Law Systems (1936) 3 U. of Chi. L. Roy. 624.
Cf. Wisdom, A Trust Code in the Civil Law, Based on the Restatement and
Uniform Acts: The Louisiana Trust Estates Act (1938) 13 Tulane L. Rev.
70, n. 1. The variation in the property laws of the civilian jurisdictions makes
impractical any general treatment of civil law property concepts. Limita-
tions of time and space preclude a separate study of the laws of each Juris-
diction. For the above reasons the present study is confined to the law of
a single nation.
8. Art. 544, French Civil Code: "La propridtd ... peut se ddflnir, le droit
en vertu duquel une chose se trouve soumise, d'1ue man44re absolue et excl-
ave, d Id volonte et l'action d'une personne." 2 Aubry et Rau, Cours de Droit
Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1897) 255-256, 1 190.
4. For an attack upon the classical view that "ownership" is an abso-
lute right, see The New Conception of Property as a Social Function, The
Progress of Continental Law in the Nineteenth Century, 31 Continental Legal
History Series (1918) 129-146, 1 § 44-53.
5. "La propridtd, tells que nous I'avons dtudide, Jusqu'd prdsent, c'est 14
proprdtd dans toute sa pidntitude, c'eat Ie drot commun de Ta propr4dtd. Mats
e. drott commun comporte des variantes, des adaptations, des lmftation,;
le droit de proprdtd, dont 1a plasticitd esat presque inflte, se prdte d des mo-
dcaitds qui constituent en mdme temps des restrictions." 1 Josserand, Cours de
Droit Civil Positif Frangais (3 ed. 1938) 989, no 1778.
6. Le Paulle, Civil Law Substitutes for Trusts (1927) 36 Yale L. . M1126
1140; 1 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5, at 809, no 1469.
7. 2 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at 270, J 191; Baudry-Lacan-
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which permits an owner to receive the fruits derived from a
thing, whether these fruits are natural or civil;8 abusus consists
of the privilege to dispose of the thiig, either materially, by
transforming it or destroying it entirely, or legally, by sale,
donation, or testamentary disposition.9 The usus, the Jructus, and
the abusus need not be united in the same individual: one may
have the usus alone, or both the usus and the fructus, or the
full ownership-the usus, the Jructus, and the abusus.1° Further-
more, each of these elements is in turn subdivided into a multi-
tude of attributes--"sub-elements" so numerous that they defy
enumeration-, and each of these attributes may be "owned" by
a different individual. It would be surprising if a system so
liberal in permitting the establishment of contemporaneous divi-
sions in ownership should offer any great obstacle to the creation
of successive interests.
One French property concept well suited as a tool to create
complex future interests-the substitution fkidicommissaire-
has played a major role in French legal history. The character-
istic elements of this device are:
(1) the disposer gives property successively to two or more
persons;
(2) the institute (the first donee) receives the fruits but is
to preserve the property itself;
(3) on the institute's death, the property is to be transferred
to the substitute.1"
In other words, the substitution fidgicommissaire is created
when A grants property to B to be preserved, and on his (B's)
death, to be transferred to C. This concept was one of the main
props of the power of the feudal aristocracy. Prior to the French
Revolution substitutions existed in enormous numbers: ninety-
tinerie et Chauveau, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Civil, Des Blena
(3 ed. 1905) 155, no 204. Cf. Huc, Commentaire Th6orlque & Pratique du Code
Civil (1893) 102, no 76.
8. Dalloz, Jurisprudence G~nerale, Repertoire Methodique et Alpha-
betique de L.gislation, de Doctrine et de Jurisprudence (1857) Vo Propritd,
no 54; Id. (Supp. 1894) at Vo Propridtd, no 21. An owner is also free to allow
a thing to remain unproductive. Baudry-Lacantinere et Chauveau, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 155, no 204.
9. 1 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5, at 809, no 1469.
10. "But if these three elements need not be in the same person, they
must all exist in someone. The most frequent division is uaus and fructue
in one person, abuaus in the other." Le Paulle, op. cit. supra note 6, at
1140.
11. 5 Planiol et Ripert, Trait6 Pratique de Drolt Civil Frangas (198)
291, no 282.
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five percert of the land of France was taken out of commerce. 12
The evils which resulted from the establishment of such a large
number of substitutions are well summarized by K. A. Cross:
"the legal order of succession was permanently changed,
the titles to property were clouded and involved in wasteful
law suits, landed property was withdrawn from commerce,
and as the motives for improvement weakened when they
were not sustained by family affection or pride, waste and
dilapidation were too often indulged, in order to gratify the
luxurious tastes and ostentatious pleasures of careless cour-
tiers."1 '
Guided by the desire to suppress the political power of the
landed aristocracy and an idea-generated by economic liberal-
ism-that the common good would be best served by the greatest
possible marketability of land,"' the redactors of the Civil Code
determined to abolish the substitution fiddiommissaire.15 This
purpose was accomplished by Article 896:14
"Substitutions are prohibited.
"Every provision by which a donee, an heir appointed, or
a legatee shall be required to keep property and to return it
to a third party shall be void, even as against the donee, the
heir appointed or the legatee.1' T
The first sentence of this article would seem to indicate that
all substitutions are prohibited. Not so. In accordance with a
well-recognized civilian rule of statutory construction, that
12. Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code of Louisiana (1925) 800.
.13. Cross, A Treatise, Analytical, Critical, and Historical, on Successions(1891) 115.
14. Rheinstein, op. cit. supra note 2, at 625.
15. Even under the Ancient R6gime the practice of creating successive
life-interests was regulate, to some extent. An Ordonnance of 1560 limited
future settlements to two lives; and a Law of 1566 imposed a general retro-
spective limit of four lives. Amos & Walton, Introduction to French Law(195) 126, n. 2.
16. The fiddcommissa fam4Narvm, by which an individual manor or
some other piece of property could be inalienably settled upon the mem-
bers of the settlor's family, was swept away by the French Revolution. Law
of November 14, 1792.
17. French text: rLe substitutions sont proMbdes.
"Toute disposatou par laquefle to donataire, 1hdrtiter inmtitud, ou is
Ugataire, sera chargd do conserver et do rendre d un ters, sera nuUl, mmeas
£ l'dgard du donataire, do fM-ditler istitud, ou du Idgata4re.'
The renunciation by either the institute or the substitute will not vali-date the disposition as to the other party; If, however, either the institute
or the substitute predeceases the testator, the other will take in full owner-
ship. Nabors, Restrictions upon the Ownership of Property In Louisiana-
Trusts', PkW Commissa, and Substitutions (1929) 4 Tulane I. Rev. 190,: 204.
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sentence is restricted by the specific provision which follows. The
narrower provision, by setting forth the characteristic elements
of the substitution idgicommissaire, confines the prohibition to
that type of substitution. The "vulgar" substitution, a disposition
by which a second party is called to take the gift in case the
first donee predeceases the donor or refuses to accept the liberal-
ity, is specifically authorized by Article 898 of the Civil Code.
If a particular device does not present all three of the
elements which characterize the substitution ftdgicommissatre,
the device is not reprobated by law.18 A number of property con-
cepts are quite similar to the prohibited substitution but lack
one or more of these elements. The fid~icommis simple is a gift
subject to a charge that it shall be transferred immediately to a
second party. The fiddicommis for a term is a device by which
the enjoyment of the property is given to one party for a period
of time with a charge that it be transferred to a second party at
the end of the stipulated period.19 In both the fidecommis
simple and the fidgicommis for a term the party first gratified is
a mere mandatary,20 and in neither case is the institute's death
the event which brings about the transfer to the ultimate bene-
ficiary. Akin to the fitdgommis simple and the fl~dicommis for a
term is the fiducia, an ancient French concept characterized by a
right in rem remarkably similar to the right created by many
common law trusts.2 ' The fiduciary in this French couhterpart of
the trust is an heir in name only. He is charged to hold as a depos-
itary the property donated and to administer it until the day he is
to transfer it to the true donee.2 As a simple administrator, he is
not privileged to retain for himself the fruits produced by the
property.23 A fiducia is distinguished from the substitution by the
intention of the donor: a person who uses the former device
does not intend to confer a benefit on the fiduciary; while the
party who sets up a substitution wishes to bestow a real and
substantial benefit on the institute.2"
Another disposition which is not within the scope of the
18. See 5 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 8, at 204, 1 694.
19. Nabors, op. cit. supra note 17, at 199.
20. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (1856) Vo Substitution, no 84; Id. (Supp.
1895) at Vo Substitution, no 15.
21. Le Paulle, op. pit. supra note 6, at 1127.
22. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (1856) VP Substitution, nos 37, 43; Id.
(Supp. 1895) at Vo Substitut4on, no 16; 18 Demolombe, Cours de Code Napo-
leon (1876) 107, no 105; 6 Hue, Commentafre Th~orique & Pratique du Code
Civil (1894) 26, no 15.
23. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (1856) Vo Substitut4on, no B8.
24. Id. at no 3%
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prohibition against the substitution fiddicommissaire is the legacy
de residuo vel de eo quod supererit,5 which grants the property to
one party, indicating that he is to have the power to alienate it,
but commands that the part of the property which remains at his
death be turned over to another person. Such a legacy lacks one
of the essential characters of the prohibited estate-a charge to
preserve the property donated-for the institute is given an
absolute privilege to dispose of the things which are the object
of the liberality. But the French do not stop with the upholding
of an ordinary legacy de residuo. The French courts have held
that the prohibited estate does not result even though a donor
forbids the party first gratified to dispose of the property by any
gratuitous title. Their rationale for this position is that the
party first gratified may alienate by onerous title.20 But Josse-
rand, one of the leading modern commentators, contends that a
donor, by inserting a stipulation forbidding alienation by gra-
tuitous title, manifests an intention to impose a charge to pre-
serve the property;2T and that a substitution fidgicommissaire
should be deemed to result.2 8
The effectiveness of Article 896 is still further diminished
by "exceptions," set out in other articles of the Code, which in
certain circumstances sanction the establishment of even the
pure substitution fiddicommissaire. The ."permitted substitutions"
are given legislative fiat by Articles 1048 and 1049.29 The former
article provides:
"The property of which fathers and mothers have the
right to dispose can be given by them in whole or in part, to
one or several of their children by an instrument inter vivos
or by will, with the obligation of returning the same to the
children boin or which may thereafter be born in the first
degree only-of said donees."80
25. Id. at no 66; Id. (Supp. 1895) at Vo Substitution, no 66; Id. (Supp.
1895), Vo Substitution, no 27; 18 Demolombe, op. cit. supra note 22, at 146-148,
no 133; 6 Huc, op. cit. supra note 22, at 35, no 22.
26. 3 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5, at 957, no 1872. A fort4ori is the dis-
position valid when the donor merely forbids the alienation of the property
by testament.
27. See Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (1856) Vo Bubstitution, no 77; 2 Bau-
dry-Lacantinerie et Colin, Tralt6 Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Civil, Des
Donations entre vfs et de Testaments (3 ed. 1905) 520, no 3111; 18 Demol-
ombe, op. cit. supra note 22, at 155, no 139. Cf. 6 Huc, op. cit. supra note
22, at 84-35, no 21.
28. 3 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5, at 957,.
29. The English translations of Articles 1048 and 1049 were taken from
Cachard, The French Civil Code (1895).
30. French text: "Les biens dont lea ptres et m res ont la lacultd do
(Vol. III
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Article 1049 states:
"A provision made by a decedent by an instrument inter
vivos or by a will, for the benefit or one or several of his
brothers or sisters, of all or part of the property composing the
succession which is not reserved by law, with obligation to
return the same to the children born or which may there-
after be born in the first degree only of the said brothers and
sisters who are donees, shall be valid in case the decedent dies
without issue."81
These articles permit a substitution f dicommissaire if the
donor is either the father or mother of the institute; or, if he has
no children and is the brother or sister of the institute.8 2 The
only limitation is that the substitution be to the profit of all the
children of the institute-not only those who were born when
the substitution was constituted but also those who were con-
ceived subsequently thereto.88 Stating the same principle some-
what differently: A may give or bequeath his property to B (one
of A's children) subject to the obligation to transmit the same to
all the grantee's children equally; (2) A (provided he dies child-
less) may give or bequeath his property to B (one of his brothers
or sisters) subject to the obligation to transmit the same to all his
(B's) children equally.8 ' Thus, in the very situations in which a
donor is most likely to desire to create a substitution fidgicom-
missaire, such a substitution is permitted by express Code pro-
vision.85
disposer, pourrant Otre par eux donts, en tout ou en partle, 4 *n ou plu-
a4eurs de leura enfants, par acts entro ile ou testamentaires, avec la charge
de rendre cea biens aux enfants n4s et d saltre, au premier degrd 8eulemeott,
desdits donataires."
31. French text: "Hera tvable, on cas de mort east enfant, la d apos4-
t4on qua Is ddfunt aura faite par acte entre 1)t4fs ou testamentaire, au profit
d'un ou pluaseur8 de se trdree ou soeora, de tout ou partie des bies qui
ne sont point rdeservde par la o dans 8a scceas4on, avec la charge db resdre
ces bons aux enf'anta ns et & n tro, au premier degrd seulement, deedite
frdree ou soeura donatatres."
32. The "permitted substitutions" may be made by either a donation
inter vivos or by a testamentary disposition.
33. Since the rights of the institute are to fall when the substitution
occurs in favor of the ultimate beneficiaries, it is important that third par-
ties be notified of the existence of the substitution: otherwise the fact that
the institute is ostensible owner of the property would create a false credit
in his favor. For this reason, Article 1069 of the French Civil Code requires
a recording of the grant establishing a substitution on the register of the
office of mortgages of the place where the property is situated.
34. If one of the children of the institute predeceases the institute, the
issue of the predeceased child "represent" their parent and receive the por-
tion that he would have received. Art. 1051, French Civil Code.
35. The exceptions to the rule prohibiting the substitution fiddicom-
miseaire are also exception.s to the rule that a person, in order to be capable
1941]
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In those instances in which a disposition cannot be brought
within the scope of either the fiddicommis simple, the fiddicom-
mis for a term, the fiducia, the legacy de residuo, or the "per-
mitted" substitutions, other techniques are available. A non-
legal method of controlling the future disposition of property is
the precatory request-"a simple wish, desire, prayer, or recom-
mendation" inserted in an act of donation.8 The precatory re-
quest is not a prohibited substitution" because it leaves the
legatee a complete legal freedom; his obligation is moral, com-
pletely outside the domain of the law. In the fact that a legal
obligation is not created lies the weakness of the precatory
request as a device for controlling the future disposition of
property: the donor can never be certain that the legatee will
comply with his request or recommendation. A more satisfactory
method of reaching the desired result is the use of an alternative
conditional legacy-a disposition functionally identical with the
prohibited substitution. Such a legacy is created by the grant
under a resolutory condition 88 of certain property to one person
and a simultaneous grant under a suspensive condition 9 of the
same property to a second party. As a general rule ownership
may be conveyed subject to either a suspensive or a resolutory
condition.40 The only doubt is as to whether the particular event
which is of the essence in the creation of a substitution fid6icom-
missaire-namely, the death of the institute-can operate as the
resolutory condition which terminates the institute's ownership
and at the same time be the suspensive condition the fulfillment
of which brings the second party's rights into immediate exist-
ence.4'1 At one time the French courts would not permit a donor
of receiving a liberality, must be born, or at least conceived, at the time of
the donation or at the moment of the decease of the testator. 3 Josserand,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 963, no 1883.
36. See Nabors, op. cit. supra note 17, at 203.
37. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (1856) Vo Substitution, no 59; 18 Demo-
lombe, op. cit. supra note 22, at 157, no 142; 2 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Conn,
op. cit. supra note 18, at 527-528, no 3132.
38. A resolutory condition Is one which, when it is fulfilled, brings about
the cancellation of the obligation and puts things back in the same state as
if the obligation had not existed. Art. 1183, French Civil Code.
39. An obligation assumed under a suspensive condition is one which
depends either upon a future and uncertain event, or upon an event which
has actually taken place but is still unknown to the parties. Art. 1181,
French Civil Code.
40. A gift may be subjected to either a suspensive or a resolutory con-
dition, so long as the condition does not reserve to the donor the privilege of
revocation at will. Amos, Perpetuities in French Law (1912) 13 J. Soc. Comp.
Leg. 47, 51.
41. The conveyance of property subject to a suspensive or a resolutory
condition creates a "divided interest"; in either case to convey a clear title
[Vol. III
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to circumvent Article 896 by the use of the alternative condi-
tional legacy.' 2 Today, however, substitutions no longer have the
odious reputation which they had under the Old RZgime; there
is no longer a fear that they will be put to the service of a landed
aristocracy;' consequently, attempts to circumvent the rule
against the substitution fiddicommissaire by the use of alterna-
tive conditional legacies have been treated with indulgence by
the courts."
The French writers state that the distinction between the
prohibited substitution and the alternative conditional legacy is
that in the former there is a "successive order" by which one
party takes after the other, the institute preserving the property
for the substitute; while in the latter there is but a "single
transmission," both parties taking directly and immediately from
the testator."5 Professor Nabors properly criticizes this distinction
as one of phraseology rather than substance." Josserand, how-
ever, defends the distinction and claims that the courts have been
consistent in its application. He states that the courts will strike
down a disposition as a substitution fidgicommissaire in disguise
if the donor is attempting through the use of a technical aiftifice
to evade the prohibition against successive orders; but that they
will not hesitate to uphold a disposition if the donor, instead of
Seeking to establish successive orders, actually attaches prime
importance to the event which conditions the legacy."
The alternative conditional legacy does not as a general rule
provide a means of "tying up" property beyond a single genera-
tion; for Article 90648 provides:
before the condition has materialized, the concurrence of two persons is
necessary.
42. 3 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5, at 960, no 1877.
43. Id. at 959, no 1876.
44. For a testamentary disposition which was upheld by the Court .of
Cassation although it was functionally equivalent to a substitution flddicom-
missaire, see Nabors, op. cit. supra note 17, at 200.
45. 14 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil Frangais (5 ed. 1876) 489, no 435;
Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (Supp. 1895) Vo Substitution, nos 83, 94.
46. Nabors, op. cit. supra note 17, at 201. "In both cases the testator
intends for the first legatee to have only the use and enjoyment of the prop-
erty, and for the bare ownership to go to his heirs if he has any, and if he
has none, for the bare ownership to go to a third party. Beyond this, the
testator in each case probably had no definite conception of the details of
the estate which he wished to create."
47. 3 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5. at 960, no 1876.
48. French text: "Pour tre capable do rcevoir entre tvfs, l sufjt d'dtre
conva au moment de la donation.
"Pour dtre capable de recevoir par testament, Ui efit d'dtre cong tI
Vdpoque da ddcda du testateur.
"Ndanmon a donation ou Ie testament n'autant quo Z'entant sera "a
table."
19411
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"To be capable of receiving a donation inter vivos it is
necessary that one should be conceived at the time of the
donation.
"To be capable of receiving under a will it is sufficient
that one should be conceived at the time of the death of the
testator.
"Nevertheless, the donation or the will only bears effect in
case the child born can live."49
By virtue of this article, an alternative conditional legacy
which contains a gift or property to B, subject to a resolutory
condition, and a gift of the same property to C subject to a sus-
pensive condition, is valid only if B and C are in existence at the
times specified by Article 906. However, an unusual case decided
by the Appeal Court of Bordeaux 5 seems to depart from the rule
of Article 906. A former bishop of P6riqueux gave 30,000 francs
to the town of Pdriqueux to support schools taught by the Frdres
de la doctrine Chr~tienne, providing that in the event of the
school's ceasing to be so taught the fund should revert to the
donor's successors in the bishopric. The condition having been
realized- that is, the municipality having adopted secular edu-
cation-the episcopal successor sought to enforce the stipulation
requiring that the property be turned over to him. The donor's
legal heirs, on the other hand, purported to revoke the gift, and
claimed restitution of the fund. The court decided in favor of the
bishop, and held that the conditional gift was a valid stipulation
pour autrui1 the fact that the beneficiary was indeterminate
being immaterial. In other words, the conditional gift to the
episcopal successor of the donor was held valid by the use of the
stipulation pour autrui5 2 although the successor was not in ex-
istence at the time of the donation." Insofar as the beneficiary of
a stipulation pour autrui need not be in existence at the time the
49. The translation was taken from Cachard, op. cit. supra note 29.
50. Bordeaux, 18 f6vrier 1891, Sirey 1892.2.89.
51. The stipulation pour autrut is a stipulation for the benefit of a third
party.
52. Art. 1121, French Civil Code: "On peut pareillement 8tipuler pour au
profit d'un tiers, lor que telle e8t Ja condition dune stipulation quo Pon
fait pour 8oi-mome ou d'une donation quo Pon fait d un autre. Celut qui
a fait cetto stipulation no pout plus la rdvoquer, s Ie tiers a ddclard vouloir
en proflter."
Translation: "A person may likewise stipulate for the benefit of a third
party when such is the condition of the stipulation that the person makes
for himself or of the donation which he makes to another person. The
person who has made the stipulation cannot revoke It if the third party
has declared that he wished the advantage of it."
53. See discussion of the case in Amos, op. cit. supra note 40, at 51.
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donation is made, an important exception is created to the rule
of Article 906, and a true "future interest" is created.
5'
The preceding sections of this comment have been devoted
to a discussion of functional equivalents of the supposedly
reprobated substitution ldgicommissaire. The following pages
will deal with French concepts which lend themselves to an
equal, if not a greater, involution of property tenures. One
device which can be used to create complicated property inter-
ests is the simple conditional grant.5 Merely illustrative of the
conditions to which a grant may be subjected is the case often
cited by the commentators: Primus can grant property to
Secundus on the condition that he shall be married and living
in France at Primus' death. Among the interests which can be
created by the simple conditional grant are some which are sur-
prisingly similar to the common law "possibility of reverter" and
"right of entry for breach of a condition subsequent." The
"possibility of reverter" has been defined as the interest "created
by conveying a fee simple, terminable, however, upon the hap-
ppning of an event certain to occur at some unpredictable time.",5
If A makes a gift to B subject to a resolutory condition, he has,
to use the common law terminology, created a "condition in
defeasance of an estate of freehold" with a reversionary interest
in his own favor. A conveyance " while the Dixie elm shall stand"
or "until the Washington monument shall fall" would be just
as valid under French as under common law.58 A "right of
entry for breach of a condition subsequent" is the interest which
is created when "a fee simple (or lesser estate) is conveyed with
a right reserved to enter and terminate it upon breach of a cer-
tain condition which is usually with relative explicitness
described as such."59 No reason exists which would make such an
interest invalid under French law.60
54. The French jurisprudence and doctrine is in confusion with regard
to the circumstances which require that the beneficiary of a stipulation pour
autrui be in existence at the time the stipulation is established.
55. Amos & Walton, op. cit. supra note 15, at 129, § 52.
56. Art. 2125, French Civil Code: "Those who have over the real estate
a right depending upon a condition, or revocable in certain cases, or which
may be cancelled, can merely grant a mortgage subject to the same con-
dition or to the same cancellation." Translation from Cachard, The French
Civil Code (1895).
57. 5 Philbrick, "Property," The National Law Library, 250-251.
58. Conditional grants are not limited In French law to donations inter
vivos or mortis causa. Conditional interests can be created by acts of sale.
Art. 1584, French Civil Code, provides: "A sale may be made absolutely or
under a resolutory condition."
59. Philbrick, op. cit. supra note 57, at 253. The Restatement of the
Law of Property describes this interest as a "power of termination."
60. The French writers state that "conditions are retroactive.!' Amos,
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Another device for controlling the future disposition of prop-
erty is the stipulation against alienation. In French law an abso-
lute prohibition against the alienation of property is void.61 A for-
tiori if the prohibition is not confined to a reasonable protection of
a legitimate interest of either the donor, the donee, or some third
party. 2 Such stipulations are contrary to public policy in that
they prevent the free circulation of property.63 If inserted in an
act of donation, they are regarded as not written and the donee
takes absolutely. 4 Formerly, a condition providing for temporary
inalienability also was deemed to be void. Now, by evolution in
the jurisprudence, French law is even more liberal than common
law -in upholding clauses of temporary inalienability. 65 Since
1858, the Court of Cassation has upheld a clause of inalienability
if the following conditions are fulfilled: 66
(1) The clause must be inserted in an act of alienation.
Usually the act of alienation is an act by gratuitous title, that
is, the donor "ties up" the property which is the object of his gift
by stipulating that it shall be inalienable. Theoretically, there
is nothing to prevent the stipulation from figuring in an act
under onerous title, such as a sale. Practically, however, a pur-
chaser will rarely agree to such a clause; from the moment he
pays the price he wants the privilege of disposing of the thing
purchased.
op. cit. supra note 40, at 49. By this they mean that the realization of a con-
dition avoids all acts which are incompatible with the newly created rights.
Thus, if A, after granting property to B subject to suspensive condition
grants the same property to 0, and still later the condition is realized, B
gets the property free from 01a claim. That "conditions are retroactive"
does not imply that a grantee whose title is subject to a suspensive condi-
tion is, upon the realization of that condition, entitled to an accounting for
fruits and revenues received from the property by the previous holder.
Whether the conditional grantee is entitled to an account for the fruits,
depends, in an act of donation on the intention of the donor, and in an
onerous contract on the intention of the contracting parties. Cf. Arts. 1040-
1041, French Civil Code.
61. A condition is equally illicit which deprives an owner of the power
to mortgage his property. 4 Hue, op. cit. supra note 7, at 103-105, no 78.
62. Ch. Civ. 8 novembre 1897, Dalloz 1898.1.47. Cf. note signed "L.S.,"
in Dalloz 1900.1.533, n. 3-6.
63. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (1856) Vo Dispos4tions entre-i fs et
testamentaire8, no 179; Id. (Supp. 1895) at Vo Dispositions entre-i47s et
testamentaires, no 54; 18 Demolombe, op. cit. supra note 22, at 298, no 278.
64. If a perpetual prohibition against alienation is inserted in a con-
veyance for value it avoids the grant entirely.
65. 1 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1022-1024, nos 1840-1844. For an
article discussing the antagonism of the common law to devices designed
to produce inalienability, see Schnebly, Restraints upon the Alienation of
Legal Interests (1935) 44 Yale L.J. 961, 1186, 1380.
66. 1 Josserand, loc. cit. supra note 65.
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(2) The clause of inalienability must be temporary.
As to what is a reasonable time to "tie up" the property, no
strict rule has been laid down; but the courts appear to have con-
sidered the lifetime of a living person to be the extreme limt.
17
On the other hand, prohibitions against alienating the property
for thirty and forty yeairs have been upheld. 8
(3) The clause of inalienability must be justified by a legiti-
mate interest.
The legitimate interest may be that of the alienor, the
acquirer, or even a third party. One example of such an inter-
est is the case where A give property to B directing the latter to
pay an annual allowance to C. In this situation, the French
courts will uphold a proviso forbidding the donee to alienate the
property bequeathed during the lifetime of the recipient of the
allowance: the maintenance of the prohibition against aliena-
tion serves to secure the payments stipulated. 9 Another illustra-
tion is furnished when the donor is the ascendant of the donee:
the law grants the donor the privilege of having the gift returned
if the descendant predeceases without posterity and the property
given is found in the succession of the deceased descendant."'
In such a situation the clause of inalienability may be inserted
to protect this privilege.
The Civil Code itself expressly provides for a certain class
of property to be inalienable. By marriage contract, it is lawful
to constitute property biens dotaux. This kind of property, dur-
ing the continuance of the marriage, cannot be alienated by
either the husband or the wife, or by both together.1'"
67. Amos, op. cit. supra note 40, at 52.
68. 1 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1023, no 1843.
69. Fuzier-Hermann, Annotated Civil Code, Art. 894, no 125.
70. Art. 747, French Civil Code: "Les ascendants succdent, d Z'excluaist
do tous autres, aux choses par eux donnes 4 leurs enfants ou descendants
ddcdd6 sans postdritd, lorsque lea objets donnds se retrouvent en nature dans
la succession.
"Si lea objets ont dtd alidnds, lea ascendants recueillent le prix qui pout
en etre d-a. Des succvdent aussi d l'action an reprise que pouvait avoir le
donataire."
(Translation) "Ascendants inherit to the exclusion of all others all
articles given by them to their children or descendants who have died with-
out issue, when the article given are found In kind in the succession.
"If the articles have been conveyed, the ascendants take the proceeds
which may be due. They also inherit the action for restitution which the donee
might have had."
71. Art. 1554, French Civil Code: "Les immeubles constituds en dot no
peuvent dtre alidnds ou hypothdquds pendant le mariage, ni par le mart, ni
par la femme, ni par lea deux conjointment, saul lea exceptions qui suivent."
(Translation) "Real estate given as dowry cannot be conveyed or mort-
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The device most frequently employed in French law to
create successive property interests through time is the usu-
fruct-the French counterpart of the common law "life estate."
2
Article 578"8 defines usufruct as "the right to enjoy things of
which another has the ownership, in the same manner as the
owner himself, but on condition of not altering the substance
thereof." The usufructuary, since he possesses in the same man-
ner as the owner, is entitled to receive the fruits, both natural
and civil, which the thing produces."' A usufruct is established
either by will, by convention of the parties, or by operation of
law. 5 The law does not permit the creation of a usufruct which
would extend beyond the life span of the usufructuary. A usu-
fruct for a term of years terminates on the expiration of the
period, or on the death of the usufructuary, whichever event
first occurs.76 If a usufruct is created in favor of a "moral per-
son"- a corporation for instance-its duration cannot in any case
exceed thirty years. 7
The usufructuary, like the "life tenant" of the common law,
is not privileged to commit waste. The law imposes upon him the
obligation to enjoy the property like a bon pare de famille,8 i.e.,
"to use it in a spirit of conservation and to administer it in a
manner to merit the approbation of a just and intelligent man."79
The usufructuary cannot excuse imprudent acts by contending
that he has administered the property as if it were his own.80 If
he commits waste or allows the property to deteriorate for want
of repairs, the court in its discretion may order cancellation of
the usufruct; or, if it chooses, it may decree that the owner
gaged during the marriage, either by the husband or wife, or by both of
them Jointly, with the following exceptions."
72. Unlike the common law life estate, the usufruct can be created on
either real or personal property. Art. 581, French Civil Code.
73. Cachard, loc. cit. supra note 29: "Llusufruit est le droit de Jouir des
choses dont un autre a la propr dtd, comme Is proprietaire lut-mgme, mata
4 la charge d'en conserver la substance."
(Translation) "Usufruct is the right to enjoy things of which another
has the owrlership, in the same manner as the owner himself, but on con-
dition of not altering their substance."
74. Art. 582, French Civil Code.
75. Art. 579, French Civil Code.
76. A usufruct granted for a term of years terminates with the usu-
fructuary's death even if the term has not expired; this rule is a matter of
public policy and cannot be contracted against by the parties.
77. Art. 619, French Civil Code. If, before the expiration of thirty years,
the "moral person" ceases to exist, the usufruct is extinguished. Dalloz, op.
cit. supra note 8 (1862) Vo Uaufruft, no 610; Id. (Supp. 1896) at Vo Usufruit,
no 275.
78. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (1862) Vo Usufruit, 487.
79. Ibid.
80. Trib. civ. de Saint-Omer, 15 avril 1892, Dalloz 1893.2.433.
[Vol. III
COMMENTS
recover the enjoyment of the thing subject to the condition that
he make annual payments to the usufructuary."
That which is left of the "full ownership" after a usufruct is
carved out is called the "naked ownership" (nu proprigtg). Upon
the cessation of the usufruct, for whatever cause, the enjoyment
of the property reverts to the "naked owner." The "naked
owner" owes no positive obligation to the usufructuary 2 His
only duty is to refrain from creating obstacles to the usufruc-
tuary's enjoyment of the property. 3
By the use of the usufruct an almost unlimited number of
complicated property interests can be created. First, successive
usufructs can be established on a piece of property,84 that is, a
number of usufructs can be created for the benefit of several per-
sons who will be called one after the other to enjoy the things
which are subject to the usufruct. 5 The validity of successive
usufructs is subordinated, so far as the persons called in the sec-
ond and third order are concerned, to the requirement that such
beneficiaries exist (or at least be conceived) at the time of the
creation of the usufruct if the usufruct is created by an inter
vivos act, or, at the moment of the decease of the donor if the
usufruct is established by testament.8 8 Second, alternative usu-
fructs may be established, in accordance with which the
beneficiaries alternate periodically in the enjoyment of the prop-
erty.87 Third, a usufruct may be created so that the usufructuary
is privileged to choose from among several things that one of
81. Art. 618, French Civil Code.
82. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (1862) Vo Uaufruft, no 587; Id. (Supp. 1896)
at Vo Usufruit, no 269; 10 Demolombe, op. cit. supra note 22, at 567,
no 652.
83. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (1862) Vo Usufruit, no 588; Id. (Supp.
1896) at Vo Usufruit, no 269.
84. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8 (1862) Vo Usufruit, no 102; Id. (Supp.
1896) at Vo Usufruit, nos 40 et seq.; 2 Aubry et Rau, op. cit. supra note 3, at
665. 1 228.
85. The intention of the grantor should be the basis for interpreting acts
establishing usufructs. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8, Vo Usufruit, nos 119-121;
Id. (Supp. 1896) at Vo Usufruit, no 48. By virtue of this rule, a stipulation of
successive usufructs, the second to open at the decease of the first legatee, is
construed to mean that the second usufruct is opened also by the renuncia-
tion of the first legatee. Req. 23 mars .1869, Dalloz 1869.1.508. But a usufruct
for the benefit of a designated person and "his heirs" is null. Dalloz, op. cit.
supra note 8 (1"62) Vo Usufruit, no 103; Id. (Supp. 1896) at Vo Usufruit, no
41. In the latter instance the courts cannot, by a fair interpretation of the
usufruct, regard it as successively established in favor of the person desig-
nated and of such heirs as were already born or conceived. Ibid.
86. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8, Vo Usufruft, no 103; 2 Aubry et Rau, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 665, § 228; Baudry-Lacantinerle et Chauveau, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 317, no 471.
87. Dalloz, op. cit. supra 8 (1862) Vo Uaufntit, no 118.
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which he prefers the enjoyment. 8 Fourth, a usufructuary can
create another usufruct on his right of usufruct. 9 The second
usufructuary acquires during his life time all of the rights of the
first usufructuary;" but, if the former predeceases, the enjoy-
ment of the property reverts to the latter. Fifth, a "naked
owner"- the holder of the residuary rights after a usufruct has
been carved out of the "full ownership"-can establish a usufruct
on his own interest." In this case, the usufructuary has only a
contingent right and may never actually have the enjoyment
of the property. Sixth, a usufruct can be constituted on a right
of lease,2 on a contract of emphyteusis 3 or on a servitude',
Seventh, property subject to a "permitted substitution" can be
granted in usufruct. 5 Eighth, a gift of the usufruct coupled with
a conditional gift of the "naked ownership" is valid.98 Even fur-
ther complications can be introduced by superimposing usufructs
subject to suspensive and resolutory conditions in the situations
enumerated above.9 7
The creator of a usufruct may retain the "naked ownership"
in himself or he may convey it to another party. If the grantor
retains the "naked ownership," the property burdened with the
usufruct reverts to him on the usufruct's termination. At com-
mon law the grantor's interest would be called a "reversion. ' ' 8
On the other hand, if A grants the usufruct to B and the "naked
88. Id. (Supp. 1896) at Vo Usufruit, no 47.
89. Id. (1862) at Vo Usufruit, no 236.
90. Ibid. Consequently the second usufructuary can mortgage his inter-
est, but this mortgage Is extinguished on his death. Ibid.
91. A legacy of the usufruct of property of which the testator has only
the "naked ownership" takes effect only after the existing usufruct term-
inates.
92. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8, Vo Usufruit, no 130; 2 Aubry et Rau,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 661, § 226.
93. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8, Vo Usufruit, no 131.
94. Id. at no 134.
95. Id. at no 132. Cf. Art. 1053, French Civil Code.
96. The gift of a usufruct to B, followed by a conditional gift of the
'naked ownership" to such of B's children as are living at the testator's
death and survive B, followed in the event of B's dying childless, by a gift
of the "naked ownership" to B, is valid disposition. Amos & Walton, op.
op. cit. supra note 15, at 130, § 52.
97. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8, Vo Usufruit, no Ill. Cf. Art. 1169, French
Civil Code. Where a usufruct is created which is to terminate upon the hap-
pening of an uncertain event, and the realization of this event becomes
impossible, the usufructuary continues in possession of the property just as
though the usufruct were for life. Dalloz, op. cit. supra note 8, Vo Usufruit,
no 709.
98. "A reversion Is that portion left of any estate after its holder creates
out of it a lesser estate in another person or persons, or several estates of a
total lesser quantity in several persons." Philbrick, op. cit. supra note 57,
at 245. See also 1 Simes, op. cit. supra note 1, at 59, 1 42.
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ownership" of the same property to C, the interest which C has
in the property would be either a "remainder" or an "executory
interest" at common law. 9 After the termination of the usufruct,
the property passes to C instead of "reverting" to A.
Similar to the usufruct are the right of use and the right of
habitation.100 Use is a restricted form of usufruct, the beneficiary
being entitled only to such fruits as are required for personal
consumption by him and his family. Habitation is the right of
use applied to a dwelling.
The contract of emphyteusis is worthy of mention. Emphy-
teusis is a contract similar to a long-term lease.1 ' Its maximum
term is ninety-nine years, while its minimum term is eighteen
years. 10 2 This limitation is not derived from the Civil Code, which
is silent on the subject of emphyteusis, but from the Law of June
25, 1902. The holder of the right of emphyteusis is entitled to the
use and the enjoyment of the thing on which his right bears; he
receives the fruits which it produces (for example, he may
exploit the -mines which were opened by the previous proprie-
tor); and finally, he may dispose of the right of which he is the
owner. Unlike the case of a usufruct, the decease of the title-
holder does not terminate the emphyteusis.1°3
Another device which the French sometimes employ in order
to control the future disposition of property is the fondation-
quite similar to the Anglo-American foundation. 10 4 The Jondation
is described by the French as "the manifestation of a human
desire to organize the future."0 5 It is a legal person, separate and
distinct from the individual who creates it."°6 Its aim is not to
grant property to this or that individual but rather to allocate
funds to the accomplishment of a fixed service. As a device for
99. See 1 Simes, op. cit. supra note 1, at 72-73, §§ 50-51.
100. Arts. 625-636, French Civil Code.
101. The contract of emphyteusis must be in writing and must be ret
istered.
102. 1 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1078, no 1949.
103. One of the Anglo-American techniques for controlling the futur
disposition of property is the employment of directions to accumulate i:
come. This device does not appear to be very common in French practic
and little light can be thrown on the possibility of its successful use
France. Amos, supra note 40, at 54.
104. Foudations. have developed to a considerable extent during the la
three-quarters of a century. For a general discussion of fondations, see
Planiol et Ripert, op. cit. supra note 11, at 961-979, nos 905-920.
105. The Iondation differs from a perpetual substitution in that it d,
not imply a series of successive devolutions. 3 Josserand, op. cit. supra r
5, at 974, no 1902.
106. Labourdette, Du Mode D'2tablissement des Foundations Perpdtu
en Drolt Modern (1897) 1-3.
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controlling the future disposition of property, the fondation is of
only limited usefulness, for it can have as its object only the per-
formance of services of "general utility"- that is, social, reli-
gious, scientific, artistic or literary services.'0 '
No provision of the Civil Code refers, either directly or
indirectly, to the fondation. This absence of Code material has
hindered development of the device. The courts, to satisfy the
aspirations of wealthy individuals, have had to draw upon the
instruments at their disposal-instruments which all too often
were poorly adapted to the end desired. The net result of the
courts' efforts has been to permit the establishment of fondations
by any of the following procedures:
(1) by the appropriation of ear-marked funds to a preex-
isting moral person or legal entity;
(2) by donation- to a natural person of the necessary funds
and the imposition upon him of a charge to utilize the funds to
achieve the objectives of the fondation;
(3) by the direct creation of a new establishment to carry
out the ideas of the founder. 10 8
The legal validity of the first of these procedures is beyond
dispute. The only prerequisite is that the pre-existing entity
obtain from the administrative courts authorization to accept the
liberality. 10
The validity of the second combination has been contested
on the ground that it approximates a prohibited substitution.
The answer of the jurisprudence to this contention has been that
the donee and the fondation are not on equal planes: that the
one does not succeed the other; that there is no successive order;
and finally that the death of the legatee is not the legally opera-
tive fact which confers the enjoyment of the property on the
fondation.
As to the third procedure, a distinction must be made
between a fondation created by act inter vivos and one estab-
lished by testament. The inter vivos fondation presents no dif-
ficulty. The founder himself constructs the necessary physical
plant, a hospital for instance; then he has the plant declared to
be an 4tablissement d'utilitd publique; finally he obtains author-
107. Ibid.
108. 8 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5, at 975-979, n- 1905-1912.
109. France has two separate and distinct systems of courts: the regular
courts and the administrative courts.
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ization for the establishment to accept a further liberality to
meet operating costs.
The testamentary fondation, on the other hand, is of doubtful
legality. A sharp conflict between the administrative courts and
the "regular" courts complicates the question. The Court of Cas-
sation, the highest of the "regular" courts, refuses to recognize
the validity of a legacy to a fondation. This refusal is grounded
on the proposition that a "future work" cannot be a determinate
legatee. °10 The court reasons that a "future work" has no legal
personality; that the declaration d'utilitd publique occurs subse-
quent to the death of the testator and does not have a retroac-
tive effect; and that, therefore, at the time of the donation there
is no legatee in existence who has legal capacity to accept the
donation. On the other hand, the Conseil d'2tat, the highest
of the administrative courts, not being bound to follow the strict
letter of the codal rules, has recognized the validity of a legacy
to a "future" person. Josserand suggests that the Court of Cassa-
tion might have reached the same result as the Conseil d'etat
by refusing to apply to cases in which the legatee is a "moral
person" the rule requiring a legatee to be in existence at the
time of the death of the testator. He supports his position by the
argument that the redactors in all probability did not have "moral
persons" in mind when they drafted' Article 906, for in 1804 such
entities were few in number, especially in the domain of private
law; and furthermore, that the very tenor of the article shows
that it was meant to be applied only to natural persons.,,"
A concept which is sufficiently plastic to permit the creation
of functional equivalents of practically every "future interest"
known to the common law, and many of which would be repro-
bated in that law as constituting prepetuities, is the donation
avec charge. This type of donation contains a clause by which
the donor imposes upon his legatee "the obligation to give, to
do, or to refrain from doing, a certain thing.11 2 The donation
avec charge is a very adaptable device: the donor can stipulate
in the most exact detail the future disposition of his property.
The device is further strengthened in that the ultimate bene-
ficiaries can sue for specific performance of the "charges"
imposed.11 8 Its only weakness as a device for planning the future
110. See Art. 906, French Civil Code.
111. 3 Josserand, op. cit. supra note 5, at 979, no 1911.
112. Berthomieu, Du Legs avec Charge (1896) 55.
113. Le Paulle, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1136.
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of property lies in the fact that the donor's heirs can revoke the
donation for non-performance of the charge and thus defeat
the rights of the beneficiary altogether.11'" This danger can be
avoided. The donor can deprive his representatives of the power
to revoke the legacy, leaving them only the power to require
specific performance.11
CONCLUSION
French lawyers and their clients can create, and in many
instances have created, property interests which in complex-
ity rival those established in common law jurisdictions. Such
devices as the "permitted" substitutions, the donation avec
charge, the stipulation pour autrui, the alternative conditional
legacy, the usufruct, the fiducia and the fondation lend them-
selves to almost infinite complication, and evidence that not only
the common law property system, but the civilian system as well,
is sadly in need of drastic reform.' Complex "future interests"
and their civilian equivalents, which today prop up the privi-
leged few just as the substitution fidgicommissaire once did the
feudal aristocracy of France, might well be relegated to history
and remembered only for their resistance to necessary reform.
F. HODGE O'NEAL *
THE LOUISIANA FAIR TRADE ACT AND INTERSTATE
TRANSACTIONS
The Krauss Company Case
Plaintiff, a manufacturer, instituted an action in the federal
district court seeking to enjoin defendant, a retailer, from selling
the plaintiff's trade-marked goods at less than the minimum
price fixed by fair trade agreements which plaintiff had made
with more than a hundred retail dealers in Louisiana under Act
13 of 1936,1 popularly known as the Louisiana Fair Trade Act.
114. A contract containing a stipulation pour autrwi can be used to ac-
complish many of the results obtained by the donation avec charge; but the
stipulation pour autrut can be used only inter vivos.
115. Le Paulle, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1137.
116. Louisiana's property system is far simpler than either those of
common law origin or that of France. Even in Louisiana, however, there is
need for considerable reform.
* Member of the Louisiana Bar.
1. Dart's Stats. (1939) H 9809.1-9809.6.
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